




One striking feature of most pornographic images is that they emphasize
what is depicted and underplay the way it is depicted: the experience of
pornography rarely involves awareness of the picture’s composition or of
visual rhyme. There are various ways of making this distinction between
what is depicted in a picture and the way the depicted object is depicted in it.
Following Richard Wollheim, I call these two aspects, the ‘what’ and ‘how’
of pictorial representation, ‘recognitional’ and ‘conﬁgurational’, respect-
ively. Some pictures emphasize one of these aspects while underplaying
the other. Pornographic pictures typically evince little concern with drawing
attention to their ‘conﬁgurational’ aspect (Levinson 2005: 232).
Instead of examining pornography, where the ‘conﬁgurational’ aspect of
experience is underplayed, I focus on a historical attempt to create images of
the female body where the ‘recognitional’ element is the one that is
underplayed and the ‘conﬁgurational’ elements of the picture form an
essential part of our experience. The pictures I have in mind are Andre´
Kerte´sz’s series of photographs from 1933 called Distortions.
I argue that Kerte´sz’s Distortions are in this respect the counterpoint of
pornography: they may be the least pornographic representations of the
female nude that exist. Instead of ignoring the conﬁgurational aspects of the
picture, making the picture transparent and fully at the service of showing
the female body and thus the triggering of arousal, Kerte´sz aims to achieve
the exact opposite. His photographs strip the female body of all its sexual
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connotations and draw our attention to the formal features of the picture—
which is quite a feat in light of the subject matter of those pictures, which
normally draws our attention away from the formal features of pictures.
The opposition between pornography and Kerte´sz’s Distortions may help
us to characterize the ‘conﬁgurational’ aspect of our experience of pictures.
It is relatively clear what the ‘recognitional’ aspect of our experience of
pictures is: it is constituted by what is depicted in the picture. It is much less
clear what the ‘conﬁgurational’ aspect of our experience is. Is it constituted
by our awareness of the picture’s surface properties? If so, could we use
reference to the depicted object in order to characterize it? Or is it consti-
tuted by our awareness of the way the depicted object is depicted? If so, what
is the relation between the ‘conﬁgurational’ aspect of our experience of
pictures and our awareness of formal properties? By examining pictures that
aim to direct our attention to the ‘conﬁgurational’ aspect of our experience
of them in spite of the fact that they are of the female nude, I hope to answer
some questions about the experience of pornographic pictures where the
‘conﬁgurational’ aspect is typically underplayed, as well as some general
questions about picture perception.
2. Distortions
The 206 photographs that constitute the Distortions series are not among the
best photographs by Andre´ Kerte´sz. In fact, they are among the least
carefully composed ones (if we do not consider the commercial work
Kerte´sz did for various fashion magazines in the 1930s and 1940s and for
Home and Garden in the 1950s). Nonetheless, they are considered to play an
important role in the history of twentieth-century photography as well as in
the history of twentieth-century depictions of the female nude. The Distor-
tions photographs were admired by (and arguably also inﬂuenced) Calder,
Picasso, Sergei Eisenstein, Henry Moore, Francis Bacon, Jean Arp, and
Giacomo Balla (but frowned upon by Alfred Stieglitz).
The art historical importance of these pictures can be attributed to two
factors. First, Kerte´sz’s photos bear clear resemblance to some important
nude paintings of the same period, notably, Matisse’s Pink Nude (1935) and
Picasso’s Girl Before a Mirror (1932), as well as to Henry Moore’s early
reclining ﬁgures. Thus, it seems that the same compositional principles
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appeared at the same time in different arts (this point was made in Kramer
1976, for example). Further, Kerte´sz’s Distortions can be seen as an inﬂuence
on a number of later works, such as De Kooning’sWomen, Dubuffet’s Corps
de dames, and maybe even Giacometti’s sculptures (again, see Kramer 1976).
It is much easier, of course, to distort parts of a female nude in a painting
or a sculpture than to do so in a photograph. Kerte´sz used two distorting
mirrors from an amusement park and employed two models, Najinskaya
Verackhatz and Nadia Kasine (although Kasine was sent home after a couple
of shots and only Verackhatz is visible in almost all of the 206 photographs).
We have reason to believe that Kerte´sz did the shooting in a relatively
short period of time and in a not particularly conscientious manner (see e.g.
Gue´gan 1933, Browning 1939, Brassai 1963, Jay 1969, Ford 1979, Phillips
1985, Lambert 1998, and Esquenazi 1998 on various aspects and circum-
stances of the shooting). While he himself remembered taking ‘about 140
photos’ (Kerte´sz 1983: 82), he in fact took 206 photos. Many of these use the
same distortion effect. One recurring effect—where the lower part of the
photo is undistorted and the upper part is stretched horizontally—can be
seen in nineteen different photographs (Distortion #59, 160, 167, 52, 172, 68,
63, 159, 165, 164, 61, 163, 157, 174, 53, 142, 176, 169, 77 ).
There is a signiﬁcant variation with regards to the degree and nature of
these Distortions. Some photos are only very slightly distorted, so they could
almost be taken to be veridical depictions (Distortion #167, 119, 6, 16, 21, 68,
74 ). Others are almost impossible to recognize (especially, Distortion #200,
73, 48, 136, 149 ). As Kerte´sz himself says in a gallery ﬂyer (for the exhibition
Andre Kerte´sz: Distortions. Pace MacGill Gallery, New York City, Novem-
ber 1983), ‘I would develop glass plates and make prints for myself. When
I showed them to the model, she told me she was quite sure that it was not
her in all of the photographs’ (quoted in Phillips 1985: 50–1). There is also a
wide variation in which parts of the female body are distorted and which
ones are not.
Twelve of these photos were published in September 1933 in Le Sourire
(the magazine that approached Kerte´sz with this idea) and a couple more in
Arts et me´tiers graphiques some months later. The rest remained unknown
until 1976, when all the surviving Distortions were published in a book
format (something Kerte´sz had been pursuing since 1933).
The Distortions photos were not the ﬁrst distorted photographs: Louis
Ducos du Hauron made distorted portraits as early as 1889. They were not
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even the ﬁrst distorted photographs in Kerte´sz’s oeuvre. He made a couple
of distorted portraits of a woman’s face in 1927 and of Carlo Rim in 1929.
His early Underwater Swimmer (1917) could also be seen as the ﬁrst in this
genre in Kerte´sz’s life—this photo was included as the ﬁrst photograph in the
Distortions volume in 1976. Nor was Distortions the last attempt at using this
method. He experimented with distorted ‘nature mortes’ in the late 1930s
and early 1940s—often in the context of advertisements, and, ironically,
these shots are often more in tune with Kerte´sz’s general compositional
principles than the 1933 series. But those less than twenty Distortions that
were known before the publication of the 1976 volume had a lasting impact
both on Kerte´sz’s reputation and on the history of nude photography.
3. Pornography in 1933?
All of these photos depict a female nude and in most of them the model is in
positions that are strongly sexually evocative. Do they then count as porn-
ography? They were certainly considered as such when they ﬁrst appeared in
print. The Distortions photographs were commissioned by, and published in,
the magazine Le Sourire, a magazine known for the frivolity of its content,
and even described by some as a ‘soft porn magazine’ (Armstrong 1989: 57).
It seemed clear that they were commissioned not so much for their aesthetic
value as for their erotic interest.
Later, when Kerte´sz emigrated to the United States, he did not manage to
sell these photos or have them published in book form precisely because
they were taken to be too pornographic. As Kerte´sz himself says later,
‘When I came to New York the publishers said to me, “In the United
States this is pornography and we will go together to prison if we publish it”’
(Kerte´sz 1983: 90).
In fact, even Beaumont Newhall, photography curator at the Museum of
Modern Art, had reservations about whether these pictures could be ex-
hibited. As he allegedly told Kerte´sz, ‘With the sex, what you have done is
pornography; without the sex, it is art’ (Colin 1979: 24). In fact, Newhall
asked Kerte´sz to crop the photos above the pelvis, but Kerte´sz was not
willing to do that. He remembers: ‘I was furious. It is mutilation, it is like
cutting off an arm or a leg’ (Kerte´sz 1983: 90).
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On reﬂection, there are at least two odd things about this controversy.
First, in about half of the Distortions photographs either the pelvis is not
visible, or else it is distorted to such a degree that it is not recognizable
(though may be imaginable). Second, Distortions was actually not that
provocative compared to some other photographic material that was circu-
lating at the time. There were much more explicit and offensive porno-
graphic photographs in that period. One important example is Man Ray’s
series of Automne, E´te´, Hiver, Printemps from 1929, four years before Distor-
tions, which are straight photographs of himself having intercourse, presum-
ably with Kiki de Montparnasse. This series was intended for a special issue
of a Brussels-based magazine, Varie´te´s on erotic poetry. The special issue
consisted of two poems, one by Aragon, one by Benjamin Pe´ret, and the
four photographs by Man Ray. It was in fact published in 215 copies (one of
them is up for sale for 23,000 USD on the internet as I write this).
The controversy over the pornographic nature of Kerte´sz’s Distortions is
especially ironic as I will argue that these pictures constitute one of the least
pornographic representations of the female nude. Thus, I agree with Charles
Hagen, who said that ‘these pictures themselves are never sexually charged’
(Naef 1994: 129) and with Sylvia Plachy who was of the same opinion: ‘I
don’t think those pictures are very sexual’ (Naef 1994: 130).
In the introduction to theDistortions, Hilton Kramer wrote that ‘Kerte´sz’s
transformations of the female anatomy are at once erotic and aesthetic’
(Kramer 1976: n.p.), but even this is an exaggeration—I aim to show that
the erotic aspect of these pictures is almost nonexistent, especially in com-
parison with the aesthetic one.
A related important question is whether these pictures objectify their
subjects. And it is difﬁcult to disagree with Kramer, who says that
They do not victimize but celebrate their subjects [ . . . ] there is humor in
these pictures but it is the humor of love. They are sometimes funny, but they are
never mean or detached or disingenuous [ . . . ]—the love songs of a photographer.
[ . . . ] They preserve a fondness for their subject that is lyrical and loving. (Kramer
1976: n.p.)
Not everyone agrees. Rudolf Kuenzli has reproached Rosalind Krauss for
being too tolerant regarding Kerte´sz’s Distortions (Kuenzli 1991: 23).
According to Kuenzli, there is ‘obvious misogyny in these works’ (Kuenzli
1991: 24). Carol Armstrong, in contrast, argues at length that the claims of
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feminist art criticism fail to apply in the case of Distortions (Armstrong 1989):
there is no ‘male gaze’, she claims, only the gaze of the female subject
directed at herself.
In short, there are open debates about whether these photographs are
pornographic, erotic, neither, or both, and if they are, how offensive they
are. I do not here want to engage with the complex issue surrounding
objectiﬁcation, but if, as I argue, these photographs are the antithesis
of pornography—as different from it as possible, then the charges of mis-
ogyny against them are surely unmotivated.
4. The Recognitional and the Conﬁgurational
The starting point of my analysis is Jerrold Levinson’s account of pornog-
raphy. Levinson argues that there is an important difference between the
way we experience pornographic pictures and the way we experience other
pictures. (I put non-pictorial forms of pornography to the side as they are
irrelevant from the point of view of the assessment of Kerte´sz’s Distortions.)
To put it simply, some images are ‘erotic images’. For Levinson, this
means that they are ‘intended to interest viewers sexually’ (Levinson 2005:
230). Not all images of sexual organs or acts are erotic images in this sense—
for example illustrations in an anatomy textbook are not. Some, but not all,
‘erotic images’ are pornographic images. These are ‘centrally aimed at a sort
of reception [that] essentially excludes attention to form/vehicle/medium/
manner, and so entails treating images as wholly transparent’ (Levinson 2005:
239). In short, ‘transparency of the medium is [ . . . ] a virtual sine qua non of
pornography’ (Levinson 2005: 237).
I am not endorsing this as a deﬁnition of pornography or of pornographic
images, which is how Levinson intended it—there may be other ways of
deﬁning pornography, not in terms of its intended reception, but in terms of
its content, for example. Nor am I endorsing the more speciﬁc claims
Levinson makes about the incompatibility of pornography and art (see
Kieran 2001 for some skepticism). What I do want to take from Levinson’s
account is his claim about our responses to, or experiences of, pornography.
How and whether we can get from this type of response to a characterization
of pornography is a question I put aside.
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The response that pornography aims at, according to Levinson, excludes
‘attention to form/vehicle/medium/manner, and so entails treating images
as wholly transparent’ (Levinson 2005: 239). However, the term ‘transpar-
ent’ brings with it a number of potential confusions. There is a large body of
literature on whether our experience of photographs is necessarily transpar-
ent in the sense Levinson claims our experience of pornography is (Walton
1984, 1997; Lopes 2003). Levinson takes this alleged similarity between
the transparency of photographs and the transparency of pornography to
be an encouraging sign, as reﬂected in the fact that ‘photography is the
prime medium for pornography, that which has displaced all other such
media in that connection’ (Levinson 2005: 232). According to Levinson, the
transparency of photographs and of pornography explains why this is the
case.
The problem is that not everyone agrees that our experience of photo-
graphs is transparent: that we see through them the way we see through
binoculars (see e.g. Warburton 1988; Currie 1991; Carroll 1995: 71; Currie
1995: esp. 70; Carroll 1996: 62; Cohen and Meskin 2004; Meskin and
Cohen 2008; Nanay 2010b), and if any of these arguments are correct,
then Levinson cannot use the experience of photographs as an analogy for
the experience of pornography. However, I do think that the gist of
Levinson’s proposal is right: our experience of pornography is transparent
in some sense of the term. But he cannot use the alleged transparency of
photographs as a way of elucidating what is meant by the concept of
transparency. Levinson is deliberately vague when characterizing the trans-
parency of our experience of pornography: he says that it ‘excludes attention
to form/vehicle/medium/manner’ (Levinson 2005: 239). But of course
these four concepts, ‘form’, ‘vehicle’, ‘medium’, and ‘manner’, are not
synonyms, and depending on which one of them we take a transparent
experience to exclude attention to, we end up with very different concepts
of transparency.
In order to make this formulation of the transparency of the experience of
pornography less ambiguous, I will add two more concepts to these four.
I borrow Dominic Lopes’s concept of ‘design-property’: a picture’s design is
constituted by ‘those visible surface properties in virtue of which a picture
depicts what it does’ (Lopes 2005: 25). I take this concept to be equivalent to
Richard Wollheim’s concept of the ‘conﬁgurations aspects’ of pictorial
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representations.1 Many philosophers make a distinction between what is
depicted by a picture and the way the depicted object is depicted in it.
Wollheim calls these two aspects, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of pictorial repre-
sentation, ‘recognitional’ and ‘conﬁgurational’, respectively (Wollheim
1980, 1987, 1998; see also Nanay 2004, 2005, 2008). Lopes calls the latter
‘design’.
Now we can reformulate what I take to be Levinson’s main claim about
the experience of pornography: we experience pornographic pictures as
transparent if our experience does not involve attention to the ‘design’ or
‘conﬁgurational’ aspect of these pictures, but only to the ‘recognitional’
aspect. I will analyze what this claim entails and show how it rules out
pornographic responses to Kerte´sz’s Distortions in the next section.
5. Inﬂection
We have seen that pictures have ‘conﬁgurational’ and ‘recognitional’
aspects: design-properties and depicted properties. Sometimes we are
attending to one, sometimes, the other, sometimes both. It is the ‘attending
to both’ that I want to analyze a bit further, with the help of the concept of
‘inﬂection’. It has been suggested that sometimes, but not always, our
experience of pictures is inﬂected. As Dominic Lopes says:
Features of the design may inﬂect illustrative content, so that the scene is experi-
enced as having properties it could only be seen to have in pictures. (Lopes 2005:
123–4)
Note that this does not happen each time we see something in a picture.
Most of the time, our experience of pictures is uninﬂected. But sometimes it
is inﬂected. Inﬂected pictorial experiences then are special. The question is
what makes them special. The most important feature of the inﬂected
experience of pictures seems to be that when we have experiences of this
1 Wollheim uses the terms ‘conﬁgurational’ and ‘recognitional’ somewhat ambiguously: he sometimes
talks about the ‘conﬁgurational’ and ‘recognitional’ aspects of our experiences and sometimes about the
‘conﬁgurational’ and ‘recognitional’ aspects of the pictorial representations. I’m assuming that the relation
between these two ways of using these concepts is the following: an aspect of an experience is ‘conﬁgur-
ational’ if it attends to the ‘conﬁgurational’ aspects of the pictorial representation, that is, to its design
properties.
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kind, the perceived object is experienced differently from the way it would
be experienced face to face. Here is Lopes again:
Design seeing transforms the content of seeing-in so that it no longer matches the
content of seeing the scene face to face. Design is ‘recruited’ into the depicted scene
so that the scene no longer looks the way it would when seen face to face. (Lopes
2005: 40)
Michael Podro, who introduced the concept of inﬂection, also says that in
the case of the inﬂected experience of pictures, the picture’s design is
‘recruited’ into the depicted scene and this is why the scene does not look
the way it would when seen face to face (Podro 1998: 13, 26). It is not clear,
however, what it is supposed to mean that the picture’s design is ‘recruited’
into the depicted scene. Podro’s other formulations of inﬂected pictorial
experiences are equally metaphorical: he says that when our experience of
pictures is inﬂected, then besides seeing the scene in the design, we also see
the design in the scene (Podro 1991: 172). He also says that inﬂected pictorial
experience straddles the boundary between the marked surface and the
depicted object (Podro 1998: 17, 28). If we want to understand the differ-
ence between inﬂected and uninﬂected pictorial experiences, we need to
make sense of these metaphors.
Robert Hopkins goes through a couple of possible interpretations of
inﬂected pictorial experiences and settles for the following:
Sometimes, what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterisation of
which needs to make reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such). (Hop-
kins 2010: 158)
I have myself defended the following concept of the inﬂected experience of
pictures: when our pictorial experience is inﬂected, we attend to a relational
property that cannot be fully characterized without reference to both the
picture’s design and the depicted object. I called these properties that we
attend to in the case of inﬂected experience of pictures ‘design-scene
properties’ (Nanay 2010a: 194). Another appropriate term would be ‘con-
ﬁgurational-recognitional’ properties. The point is that both aspects of the
picture (both the conﬁgurational and the recognitional, both the design and
the depicted) show up in our experience.
There are many ways of unpacking the notion of ‘design-scene property’:
it could be referred to as the property of how features of the picture’s design
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give rise to or undergird the experience of the depicted object; or of how the
depicted object emerges from the design, etc. What is important is that
when our pictorial experience is inﬂected, we are consciously attending to
‘design-scene properties’.
Not all ‘design-scene properties’ are particularly interesting, and attention
to ‘design-scene properties’ does not guarantee the aesthetic appreciation, let
alone the aesthetic experience, of a picture. But this concept is general
enough to accommodate the main candidates for, and intuitions about,
inﬂection. When we have an inﬂected pictorial experience, we experience
how the depicted object emerges from the design. We see the depicting
design ‘undergirding’ the depicted scene: ‘seeing a picture as a picture
amounts to seeing its undergirding—to seeing, as it were, the process of
depiction and not merely its product’ (Lopes 2005: 39). Design seeing,
which is necessary for inﬂected pictorial experiences, ‘amounts to seeing
design features as responsible for seeing-in’ (Lopes 2005: 28). Or, as Hopkins
says (summarizing the view he himself disagrees with): ‘inﬂection [ . . . ] offers
us the opportunity better to appreciate how the one emerges from the other’
(Hopkins 2010: 165). It is hard to see how these properties we see in surfaces
would be capable of all this if they were not relational: if they did not make
reference both to the picture’s design and to the depicted object.
If this analysis is correct then the way we experience pornography cannot
be a case of inﬂected pictorial experience. The experience of pornography,
as we have seen in the last section, excludes attention to the ‘conﬁgurational’
or ‘design’ features of the picture, whereas in the case of inﬂected experi-
ences, we attend to a relational property that cannot be fully characterized
without reference to the ‘conﬁgurational’ or ‘design’ features of the picture.
The experience of pornography and inﬂected pictorial experience are in-
compatible.2
And now we can return to Kerte´sz’s Distortions. A crucial feature of these
photographs is that they force us to have an inﬂected pictorial experience.
More precisely, it is not possible to see the depicted object in these pictures
without attending to the ‘design-scene properties’ of these pictures. In the
case of most pictures, we can attend to a variety of different properties of the
picture while seeing the depicted object in the picture. When I am looking
2 Like Levinson, I use the term ‘the experience of pornography’ as a shorthand for ‘the experience
pornography intends to trigger or has the function of triggering’.
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at Ce´zanne’s The Bay from L’Estaque, I can attend to smoke coming out of
the chimney on the right without paying any attention to the design
properties at all. Or, I can attend to the ways in which just a couple of
brushstrokes give rise to the depiction of swirls of smoke. The latter experi-
ence is inﬂected, the former is not. And it is up to us which kind of
experience we have while seeing the smoke in the picture.
But in the case of the Distortions photographs, if our experience is not
inﬂected, we have no chance of seeing the depicted nude in the picture. In
order to know whether we see a woman with slender arms (distorted) or
with very thick arms (undistorted), we need to also attend to the way the
nude is distorted in the mirror. In many cases, in order to even be able to
recognize which body part is in the upper left corner of the picture, one
needs to attend to the way the nude is distorted in the mirror—to the
‘conﬁgurational’ or ‘design’ aspects of the picture. In short, the Distortions
photographs force us to have an inﬂected experience: if we want to see what
is depicted at all, we need to see it in an inﬂected manner.
But if, as I argued, inﬂected experience and the experience of porno-
graphic pictures exclude each other, then this makes it extremely difﬁcult to
experience Kerte´sz’s photographs as porn.3 This makes Kerte´sz’s Distortions
photographs examples of anti-pornography: pictures that, rather than being
disposed to trigger reactions normally associated with pornography, are
carefully constructed in such a way that they make any such reaction
extremely unlikely.
Hilton Kramer notes in his introduction to Distortions that ‘Kerte´sz’s
images [are] often close to the frontiers of abstraction’ (Kramer 1976: n.p.).
This is true of Kerte´sz’s photographs in general, but also true of the Distor-
tions photographs. They are indeed close to the frontiers of abstraction, but
they are also careful not to trespass those frontiers. As Kerte´sz emphasized in
his piece ‘Caricatures and Distortions’ in the third volume of the Encyclopedia
of Photography, ‘the viewer must not be left in a state of bewilderment which
so often results from seeing the unrelated mass of curves, angles, lights and
3 I said this makes it extremely difﬁcult to experience these pictures as porn. It does not make it strictly
speaking impossible to do so—I do not want to deny that, in some sense of possibility, it is possible to
experience nude photographs as porn. It may be possible, for example, to experience the conﬁgurational
features of these photographs as simply an obstacle to having a pornographic experience. This is clearly
not the experience Kerte´sz’s photographs are intended to trigger.
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shadows which compose the poorer distortion pictures. There must be an
emphatic governing theme in every picture’ (Kerte´sz 1970: 569–70).
The Distortions photographs, like most of Kerte´sz’s photographs, make
sense both as ﬁgurative photographs and also as abstract compositions. But,
and this is what is unique about this series, we cannot see these photographs
as ﬁgurative photographs without also seeing them as abstract compositions
of ‘unrelated mass of curves, angles, lights and shadows’. It is only the
attention to the ‘unrelated mass of curves, angles, lights and shadows’ that
make it possible to see the female nude in these pictures. And this experience
is the exact opposite of the experience associated with pornography.
6. Conclusion: Kerte´sz’s Distortions versus Man Ray’s
Mr and Mrs Woodman
In conclusion, I want to contrast the radical nature of Kerte´sz’s experiment
with the anti-pornographic depiction of the female nude with another,
equally radical attempt but in the opposite direction. Man Ray’s photo-
graphs in his Mr and Mrs Woodman series depict two small wooden manne-
quins without faces making love in various (quite suggestive) positions. Man
Ray ﬁrst experimented with these pictures in 1926–7 (Mr Woodman made
his appearance, all alone, even earlier, in 1920), but made a series of 27
photographs in 1947, which were later published in 50 copies by Editions
Unida (1970). (He used the same wooden mannequins in other, self-stand-
ing photos, for example in hisMr and Mrs Woodman in front of the TV (1975),
which are not particularly erotically charged.)
AlthoughMan Ray’sMr and Mrs Woodman photographs are not of human
bodies, but rather of pieces of wood stuck together, they manage to achieve
the result that the ‘recognitional’ aspect of our experience effectively ousts
the ‘conﬁgurational’ one: we are prompted to experience these photographs
as pornography—the design is very unlikely to show up in our experience.
In short, there is a striking contrast between the way we naturally experi-
ence Kerte´sz’s Distortions and the way we naturally experience Man Ray’s
Mr and Mrs Woodman series. What makes the contrast between these works
of two great modernist photographers, Kerte´sz and Man Ray, especially
striking is that while Kerte´sz uses the naked female body, the erotic subject
par excellence, he manages to make the ‘recognitional’ aspect of pictorial
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representation irrelevant, whereas Man Ray uses pieces of wood, something
that is par excellence not erotic, and manages to make the ‘conﬁgurational’ of
the pictorial representation irrelevant.
Kerte´sz makes anti-pornography with female nudes, whereas Man Ray
makes pornography with pieces of wood.
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